Cross-border overview: FCPA enforcement in Latin America

What impact has the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) had in Latin America? The region has been – and unfortunately remains – fertile ground for FCPA enforcement. In 2011, roughly 25 per cent of the DoJ’s FCPA cases involved Latin America.¹ US authorities are investigating the well-publicised allegations that Wal-Mart and Citigroup each violated the FCPA while doing business in Mexico.² And several companies, such as Grifols and Orthofix, have disclosed potential corrupt activity in Latin America in their recent public securities filings.³ There is no sign that FCPA enforcement in the region will abate any time soon.

Historical context helps. When it enacted the FCPA in 1977, Congress sought to (i) protect US foreign policy interests that could be undermined if US companies bribed foreign officials; (ii) protect global markets from the distorting effects of bribery; (iii) help companies resist demands for bribes by creating stiff criminal penalties for corrupt behaviour; and (iv) claim a global leadership role and to push other countries to take a stand against corruption.⁴ Measured against these goals, the FCPA has had mixed success in Latin America: while the statute has allowed the US to police companies with US ties doing business in the region, there is little evidence that the statute has reduced the amount of bribe money flowing through it. However, in recent years, Latin American governments have begun to pass significant anti-bribery laws targeting corruption within their borders. Although it goes one step too far to claim that the FCPA caused these recent legislative developments, it is accurate to say that several Latin American countries, particularly those with relatively high levels of foreign investment or the potential to receive such investment, have ramped up their efforts to fight public corruption.

This article proceeds in three parts. The first part examines recent trends in FCPA enforcement actions in Latin America. Part two discusses efforts by several Latin American governments to pass and enforce, with varying degrees of success, their own anti-corruption laws. Finally, in the third part, we discuss what we think anti-corruption and anti-bribery enforcement priorities will be in Latin America in the foreseeable future.

Recent FPCA enforcement actions in Latin America

We have identified several trends running through the US government’s recent FCPA enforcement actions in Latin America.

Industry sweeps

For several years, the US government has conducted global industry-focused ‘sweeps’, such as when the DoJ and the SEC investigated corruption in the medical device industry. Their investigations targeted medical device companies who bribed health-care providers and administrators employed by foreign government agencies. Several of these investigations involved, at least in part, corrupt activity in Latin America.

For example, on 24 October 2013, Stryker Corporation, a medical supply company based in Michigan, agreed to pay the SEC more than US$13.2 million to settle charges that it, through various subsidiaries, violated the FCPA by paying US$2.2 million in bribes to health-care professionals and government officials in Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Poland and Romania. These bribes allegedly generated US$7.5 million in illicit profits. The SEC did not disclose what percentage of the fine was attributable to conduct in Argentina and Mexico, although it did find that, in Mexico, Strkyer’s subsidiary directed its law firm to pay a US$46,000 bribe to a government employee to secure a contract worth US$1.1 million^.5

On 20 December 2012, pharmaceutical manufacturer Eli Lilly & Co agreed to pay US$29,398,734 to resolve SEC charges that it, through subsidiaries, bribed government officials in Russia, Brazil, China and Poland. The Brazilian component of the case involved bribes allegedly paid to government health officials to win US$1.2 million in business from state health-care institutions.⁶

On 10 July 2012, Orthofix International NV, a medical device company headquartered in Curaçao, agreed to pay a US$2.22 million fine to settle charges that it, through a subsidiary named Promeca, paid approximately US$300,000 to Mexican officials to secure medical-supplies contracts worth millions of dollars.⁷ Orthfix also agreed to resolve a related SEC investigation by disgorging roughly US$5 million in profits connected to the FCPA violations.⁸ As noted above, Orthofix recently disclosed additional potential FCPA violations in Brazil.

On 26 March 2012, Indiana-based Biomet, Inc entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DoJ to resolve allegations that it paid US$1.5 million in bribes to publicly employed health-care providers in Argentina, Brazil and China which were falsely recorded as commissions or consulting fees.⁹ Biomet agreed to pay a US$17.28 million penalty to the DoJ, and disgorged US$5.5 million in profits and interest to the SEC in a parallel proceeding.¹⁰

Before it conducted the medical device sweep, the US brought numerous enforcement actions against oil and gas companies. Between 2001 and 2011, roughly one-third of all FCPA enforcement actions focused on this sector.¹¹ While most of these actions involved the Middle East and former Soviet states, companies doing illicit business in Latin America did not escape unscathed. In one such case in October 2010, the DoJ entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with Pride International, a Houston-based operator of offshore drilling rigs, after it disclosed that an internal audit had discovered evidence of bribery. Pride agreed to pay a penalty of US$32.6 million in respect of US$804,000 in bribes it paid or caused to be paid to government officials in Venezuela, India and Mexico.¹² Pride was also linked to the massive, multinational corruption investigation of Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd, which admitted to paying roughly US$27 million to foreign officials in at least seven countries, including Brazil.¹³

Size of fines

The size of the fines imposed by the DoJ and the SEC for FCPA violations in Latin America has remained fairly proportional to the size of the bribe paid and the benefit obtained. However, the absolute dollar value of these fines has fallen since the start of this decade. No recent FCPA actions in Latin America have been as large, or as expensive to resolve, as the Siemens AG matter concluded in 2008. In that case, Siemens AG paid a total of US$800 million to the DoJ and the SEC to resolve a panoply of FCPA charges stemming from corrupt conduct around the world, which included bribing government officials in connection with building metro transit lines in Venezuela and energy refineries in Mexico.¹⁴ Whether due to increased efforts by companies to police themselves (a trend which the DoJ has encouraged and rewarded), or to growing efforts by regional governments to fight internal corruption, nine-figure fines are increasingly rare occurrences.

For example, on 9 April 2014, the DoJ announced FCPA enforcement actions against Hewlett Packard (HP) entities in Poland, Russia and Mexico. Here, Hewlett Packard Mexico, S de RL de CV (HP Mexico) falsified books and records and circumvented HP internal controls to sell hardware and software to Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s state-owned petroleum company. To secure the Pemex contracts, HP Mexico retained a third-party consultant with ties to senior Pemex executives and paid the consultant a US$1.41 million commission through a third party, who then passed US$125,000 of the payment on to a Pemex official.¹⁵ HP Mexico agreed to forfeit US$2,527,750 as part of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the DoJ, while the penalties imposed on HP entities worldwide topped US$108 million.¹⁶

Prosecution of individuals

The US has not been shy about prosecuting individuals for violating the FCPA. Throughout 2013 and 2014, the DoJ charged several broker-dealer employees and foreign officials in connection with a massive international bribery scheme involving Venezuela’s state-owned development bank, BANDES. The employees allegedly bribed a senior BANDES official to steer the bank’s trading business to the broker-dealer. The DoJ’s investigation culminated with the 2014 arrest of the broker-dealer’s CEO and managing partner, who were charged with conspiring to bribe BANDES.¹⁷

Similar individual enforcement actions took place in the petroleum sector. In connection with the Pride corporate enforcement action, the SEC brought charges against Pride’s former country manager in Venezuela. He agreed to pay a US$25,000 penalty.¹⁸ The prior year, another former Pride executive had agreed to pay a US$40,000 penalty to resolve similar allegations.¹⁹

Continued use of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements

The DoJ has continued to resolve cases – particularly where the defendant has self-disclosed and cooperated with the government’s investigation – through the use of NPAs and DPAs. In the HP case, HP Mexico entered into an NPA in which it agreed to forfeit US$2.5 million and cooperate fully with the government’s investigation in exchange for the government’s promise not to prosecute it for violating the FCPA.²⁰ Similarly, the DoJ allowed Pride to resolve its FCPA troubles via a DPA in which it agreed to pay a penalty and to enhance its corporate compliance programme.

The SEC has shared the DoJ’s positive view of companies that self-report and cooperate. On 22 April 2013, Ralph Lauren Corp agreed to disgorge US$734,846 in profits (and interest) earned in connection with bribes paid by a subsidiary to government officials in Argentina. In light of Ralph Lauren’s ‘prompt’ reporting and ‘exceptional assistance’ during the investigation, the SEC elected not to charge the company with violating the FCPA. In a press release, then-Acting Director of Enforcement George Canellos said that the decision not to charge Ralph Lauren ‘makes clear that [the SEC] will confer substantial and tangible benefits on companies that respond appropriately to violations and cooperate fully with the SEC’.²¹

While the third part of this article discusses possible future FCPA enforcement priorities, these cases highlight a key issue: many recent enforcement actions involve illegal conduct in several countries. This may be in part due to the DoJ’s efforts to police global corruption on an industry-by-industry basis and the concomitant pressure placed on companies it investigates to root out FCPA violations wherever they do business. Such cases generally yield the stiffest financial penalties – which makes sense, given that the penalties reflect corrupt activity in several countries.

Local efforts to combat bribery and corruption

When Congress first considered the FCPA, a Senate subcommittee report addressed the concern that the statute would be seen as an attempt by the US to export morality:

The fact is that virtually every country has its own laws against bribery, although some are not vigorously enforced. Given world-wide outcry at the corrupting influence of some United States-based multinationals on foreign governments, [we] believe that most countries would welcome a greater effort by the United States to discourage offensive conduct by US companies, wherever their activities may take place.²²

In Latin America, at least, Congress was correct: laws against bribery have been on the books for years, but they have proved wholly inadequate to battle corruption and widespread bribery.²³ In many countries, this still holds true. In a 2013 poll conducted by Vanderbilt University, over 40 per cent of respondents from Haiti, Bolivia and Ecuador indicated that a public official had asked them to pay a bribe within the past year. The numbers are only slightly better in Mexico and Peru, which came in at 31 and 28 per cent, respectively.²⁴

Recent developments, however, indicate that Latin America has stepped up its anti-corruption efforts. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico have signed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, and have thus agreed to criminalise the bribery of foreign government officials in connection with international business transactions. Mexico and Chile have joined the OECD outright.²⁵ Many countries in the region, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, are parties to the United Nations and Inter-American Conventions Against Corruption, and have enacted their own domestic anti-corruption laws.²⁶ We discuss several examples below.

Brazil

Brazil’s anti-corruption efforts took a significant step forward on 28 January 2014, when the Clean Companies Law came into effect. The law imposes liability on companies for bid rigging, fraud in public procurement, and for bribing domestic or foreign officials.²⁷ It authorises penalties of up to 20 per cent of a company’s annual revenue, and applies to Brazilian companies as well as foreign companies doing business in Brazil.²⁸ It also permits the seizure and confiscation of corporate assets, and, in serious cases, the dissolution of a company. Like the UK Bribery Act, the Clean Companies Law encourages companies to have a robust compliance programme designed to prevent corruption; however, unlike the UK Bribery Act, such a compliance programme can only mitigate, rather than provide a complete defence against, a charge of bribery. Individuals charged with bribery under the Clean Companies Law face fines and may be imprisoned for up to 12 years.²⁹

The Clean Companies Law reflects corruption’s growing significance in Brazil’s political agenda. As of March 2010, according to a major Brazilian newspaper, the Brazilian Federal Police were investigating nearly 30,000 crimes involving bribery or corruption.³⁰ In 2011, President Dilma Rousseff fired several cabinet members facing corruption allegations. Between 2012 and 2013, the Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal sentenced more than 10 politicians, including José Dirceu, the former chief of staff to ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, to a 10-year prison sentence in connection with the ‘Mensalão’ vote-buying scandal – the most well-publicised corruption case in the country’s history.³¹  In February 2013, a Brazilian state prosecutor filed civil charges against a unit of Brookfield Asset Management and its executives, alleging that one of its subsidiaries paid bribes totalling 1.3 million reais to officials in São Paulo to obtain permits needed to expand a shopping mall there.³² Just last year, in spring 2013, Brazilian authorities, including the Public Attorney’s Office for São Paulo and the Brazilian antitrust regulator, launched a series of investigations into alleged bid rigging by an cartel of 13 companies in connection with the acquisition, maintenance and construction of train lines in São Paulo.³³

These domestic enforcement actions appear to have had, at least to some degree, their intended effect. One author found no coincidence that ‘when news of harsh sentences against top ruling party politicians dominated the headlines in Brazil, the number of Brazilians who were asked to pay bribes fell by half.’³⁴ Even so, Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index still ranks Brazil as the 72nd (out of 177) most corrupt country in the world.³⁵

Argentina

Argentina has a poor track record for domestic prosecution of corruption offences. According to research by the Centre for the Investigation and Prevention of Economic Crime, only 10 individuals were sentenced in 750 corruption investigations launched by Argentinian authorities between 1983 and 2007.³⁶ However, throughout 2013, Argentina’s House of Representatives introduced a number of bills aimed at facilitating the prosecution of corruption-based crime. Bill No. 7130, introduced in October 2013, would extend the statute of limitations for bribery cases involving public officials and create a ‘National Commission Against Corruption’ to investigate officials accused of participating in bribery.³⁷ Bill No. 5818, introduced two months earlier, enhanced the protections offered to informants, special witnesses, witnesses, and victims of public corruption, while Bill No. 5834 would do the same for whistle-blowers.

Notwithstanding its poor track record, Argentinian authorities have in recent years investigated and prosecuted senior government officials for corruption-related offences. On 27 December 2012, Felisa Miceli, former Minister of Economy of the Kirchner Administration, was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and eight years’ disqualification from holding public office. She was found guilty of embezzlement, aggravated by her having committed the crime while in office.³⁸ More recently, in July 2014, sitting Vice President Amado Boudou was indicted on corruption charges for inappropriately using his influence to help the Ciccone Calcográfica mint company escape bankruptcy, after which the company was brought under the control of an investment fund tied to Mr Boudou.³⁹

Colombia

In 2011, Colombia adopted its Anti-Corruption Statute, ‘a comprehensive policy that gives [the government] new tools to crack-down on corruption and stiffer penalties for those found guilty.’⁴⁰ According to the US Department of State, Colombia has a ‘forceful anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regime’, even though the steady influx of drug money remains a problem.⁴¹ While no official statistics have been published, we understand that Colombian authorities are very active, and that anti-corruption and anti-bribery investigations take place regularly.⁴²

Mexico

Mexico enacted its Federal Anti-Corruption Law on 12 June 2012. Similar to the FCPA, it holds individuals and companies liable for giving or offering money of gifts in exchange for a business advantage in connection with public contracts in Mexico.{{+footnote}} Baseline fines may range from US$5,000 to US$250,000 for individuals and from US$50,000 to US$10 million for companies. The fine may be increased by up to 50 per cent if the amount of the windfall obtained as a result of the corrupt activity exceeds the maximum baseline fine, and it may be reduced by as much as 70 per cent if an offender self-reports.⁴⁴

Over the past few years, Mexican authorities have investigated both domestic political figures and multinational corporations suspected of corrupt activity. For example, on 21 September 2012, Marisela Morales Ibáñez, head of the Mexican Federal Prosecutor’s Office, stated that at least 770 public officials in various sectors were removed from office for failing ‘trust and quality’ examinations.⁴⁵ And earlier this year, the Mexican government took control of Oceanografía, the oil contractor at the heart of the US probe into Citigroup and its Mexican subsidiary Banamex. Banamex is alleged to have made nearly US$400 million in fraudulent loans to Oceanografía.⁴⁶ Mexico’s Attorney General has issued warrants against three high-ranking Banamex employees for ‘failure to prevent wrongdoing as mandated’ by Mexican banking regulations, and the Mexican Senate has appointed Senator Roberto Gil Zauarth to investigate allegations that high-ranking government officials from previous administrations were involved in the Banamex fraud.⁴⁷ Mexican authorities launched similar probes in response to the 2012 allegations that Wal-Mart bribed public officials to facilitate its rapid growth in Mexico.⁴⁸

Chile

Chile’s Legal Entities Criminal Liability Law allows companies operating in the country to mitigate or potentially avoid liability for certain kinds of criminal activity, including bribery, by implementing adequate internal crime-prevention controls. For controls to be deemed adequate, they must be certified by external auditors or risk rating companies supervised by the Chilean Securities and Insurance Commission.⁴⁹

Since the conclusion of the Siemens investigation, there has been little FCPA enforcement activity in Chile. However, Chilean authorities have prosecuted numerous public officials for corruption offences, including 42 current and former government employees charged with accepting bribes to modify criminal records, and officials of the Interior Ministry and the Investigation Police for bid rigging intended to benefit companies owned by family members of government functionaries.⁵⁰

New horizons for anti-corruption enforcement

We have identified several trends in FCPA enforcement that we expect to see develop in the coming months. None of these represent a major change of direction for the DoJ or the SEC. To the contrary, we expect US regulators to continue the same basic FCPA enforcement strategies that have served them well in recent years, though with a slightly recalibrated focus where required.

First, the DoJ and the SEC likely will continue to concentrate on investigating activities in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), and to rely on whistle-blowers and tips to identify new cases.⁵¹

Second, US regulators likely will continue to probe key industries where the risk of corruption is high (such as in the oil and gas industry). We may see industry sweeps in sectors, such as technology or infrastructure, where competition to win lucrative government contracts remains fierce.

Third, it is all but certain that the US government will continue to encourage cooperation amongst its various regulators and law enforcement agencies, and between those agencies and their counterparts in other countries. In a November 2013 speech, Deputy Attorney General James Cole noted that the DoJ would work with domestic partners – such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Commerce – and foreign partners to facilitate FCPA investigations.⁵² Such cooperation has been on full display in, for example, the Wal-Mart investigation in Mexico, where US authorities are cooperating with their Mexican counterparts to investigate allegations of bribery. Companies facing FCPA investigations should therefore remember to retain counsel who can interface with local authorities as needed.

Fourth, the DoJ and the SEC likely will continue to ‘reward’ cooperation, prompt disclosure and robust remediation efforts designed to enhance FCPA compliance. In this regard, NPAs, which do not require court approval to become effective, may ultimately be a more attractive option than DPAs, which are subject to court approval and therefore riskier for the parties.

Fifth, we expect the countries with the greatest exposure to foreign investment – such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico – to be the most aggressive in fighting corruption. We could see new legislation (like Brazil’s Clean Companies Law) or the increased enforcement of existing anti-corruption laws help make such countries less risky destinations for corporate investment and development.

Finally, according to a recent survey of Latin American law firms, bribery and corruption matters are expected to remain the top focus of regional regulatory and law enforcement activity. Respondents anticipate significant anti-corruption activity over the next three years in Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico and Trinidad. We therefore expect enforcement activity to remain high (or increase) throughout the region.

Notes

1. See ‘Anti-Corruption Developments: 2012 End-of-Summer Round-Up: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’, Mondaq Business Briefing (15 October 2012).
2. David Voreacos and Renee Dudley, ‘Wal-Mart Says Bribe Probe Cost US$439 Million in Two Years’, Bloomberg News (26 March 2014), www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-26/wal-mart-says-bribery-probe-cost-439-million-in-past-two-years.html; ‘SEC investigates Citigroup over fraudulent Mexican loans’, Reuters (2 March 2014), www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-citigroup-mexico-fraud-idUSBREA210QF20140302.
3. See, eg, ‘Grifols discloses probes in multiple countries’, The FCPA Blog (19 June 2014), www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/6/19/grifols-discloses-probes-in-multiple-countries.html; ‘Orthofix reports Brazil payments to DoJ, SEC’, The FCPA Blog (26 March 2014), www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/3/26/orthofix-reports-brazil-payments-to-doj-sec.html.
4. Mike Koehler, ‘The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 929, 943, 949 (2012).
5. Press Release, SEC, ‘SEC Charges Stryker Corporation With FCPA Violations’ (24 October 2013), www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540044262.
6. Press Release, SEC, ‘SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company With FCPA Violations’ (20 December 2012), www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116.
7. United States v Orthofix International, N.V. (Deferred Prosecution Agreement), 4:12-cr-00150-RAS (E.D. Tx. 2012); United States v Orthofix International, N.V. (Information), 4:12-cr-00150-RAS (E.D. Tx. 2012).
8. Bribery and Corruption: Recent enforcement activity in the UK and US, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (October 2012) [hereinafter Bribery Watch]. Bribery Watch is an online tool developed and maintained by Freshfields that tracks anti-bribery and corruption-related developments in 150 countries.
9. Press Release, Biomet, ‘Third Medical Device Company Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation’ (26 March 2012) www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-crm-373.html.
10. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
11. Harry Clark and Jonathan Ware, ‘Limits on International Business in the Petroleum Sector’, 6 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 75, 128 (2011).
12. United States v. Pride Int’l, Inc. (Deferred Prosecution Agreement) (S.D. Tx. 11 November 2010).
13. Press Release, DoJ, ‘Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than US$156 Million in Criminal Penalties’ (4 November 2010), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html.
14. Id.; Press Release, SEC, ‘SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery’ (15 December 2008), www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
15. ‘Hewlett Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery’, 9 April 2014 (HP Press Release), available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/April/14-crm-358.html.
16. Letter from Jeffrey Knox to F Joseph Warin, 9 April 2014 (HP Mexico NPA), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-mexico/hp-mexico-npa.pdf.
17. Press Release, DoJ, ‘CEO and Managing Partner of Wall Street Broker-Dealer Charged With Massive International Bribery Scheme’ (14 April 2014), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/April/14-crm-381.html.
18. Clark, supra note 11, at 130.
19. Id.; Dep’t of Justice, Summaries of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Actions by the United States January 1, 1998 – September 30, 2010, www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-appx-c.pdf.
20. HP Mexico NPA, supra note 16.
21. Press Release, SEC, ‘SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement With Ralph Lauren Corporation Involving FCPA Misconduct’ (22 April 2013), www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514780. Following the announcement of this action, Argentinian tax authorities launched an investigation into the company’s local subsidiary. See Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
22. Koehler, supra note 4, at 945, quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1031, at 4-5 (1976).
23. See Fernando Avelar, ‘UPDATES-FCPA Risks for US Companies in Latin America, Renewable Energy Thrives in Brazil, and Mexico and the New PRI: Enrique Pena Nieto’, 18 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 605, 608-609 (2012).
24. Andres Oppenheimer, ‘Latin America’s corruption starts at top’, Miami Herald (9 February 2013).
25. Michael Martinez, ‘What anti-corruption developments in Brazil and Latin America mean for you’, Inside Counsel (25 June 2014), www.insidecounsel.com/2014/06/25/what-anti-corruption-developments-in-brazil-and-la; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf; List of OECD Member Countries, www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm.
26. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
27. The Clean Companies Law: Brazil joins the global fight against corruption, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (January 2014), www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Brazil%20Clean%20Companies%20Law%20-%202014.PDF.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
31. Oppenheimer, supra note 22;. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
32. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Whitney Eulich, ‘With Brazil’s Petrobras under fire for corruption, have Brazilians had enough?’, The Christian Science Monitor (18 April 2014), www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2014/0418/With-Brazil-s-Petrobras-under-fire-for-corruption-have-Brazilians-had-enough.
36. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.; ‘VP Amadou Boudou files appeal against corruption indictment’, Buenos Aires Herald (18 July 2014).
40. 2013 Investment Climate Statement – Colombia, US Dep’t of State (February 2013), www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204622.htm.
41. 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)– Vol. II, US Dep’t of State (1 July 2013), www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/database/211180.htm.
42. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
43. Allie Showalter Robinson, ‘Developments in Anti-corruption Law in Mexico’, 19 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 81, 81, 88 (Winter 2013).
44. Id.
45. Bribery Watch, supra note 8.
46. Elisabeth Malkin and Michael Corkery, ‘Mexico Authorizes Arrests in Fraud at Citigroup Unit’, The New York Times (2 June 2014).
47. Id.
48. Ivan Castano, ‘Mexico Launches Anti-Corruption Law as Wal-Mart Scandal Worries Government’, Forbes (27 April 2011), www.forbes.com/sites/ivancastano/2012/04/27/mexico-launches-anti-corruption-law-as-wal-mart-scandal-worries-government/.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Anti-bribery and corruption: frontier markets and global enforcement, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (September 2013), http://freshfields.uberflip.com/i/188439.
52. James M Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Speech at the FCPA Conference (13 November 2013), www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119.html.