What should government authorities do when companies get into trouble? That question has become increasingly important among legal practitioners, regulators and commentators, and has led to dialogue about the role of individual responsibility in the corporate setting, the appropriateness of fines and penalties on corporations and the consequences for a public company that pleads guilty to a crime. As prevailing practices continue to develop, one sanction that has become more common in the corporate setting is the appointment of an independent monitor. In recent years, household names such as Apple, Avon and Western Union have all seen government investigations end with the appointment of a monitor to oversee aspects of the company’s operations. And, although frequently used as a tool by the US Department of Justice (DOJ), numerous other regulators have appointed monitors following an inquiry, including the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York State Department of Financial Services and the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office.
This guide takes an in-depth look at the corporate monitor – defined broadly by both the DOJ and the SEC as ‘an independent third party who assesses and monitors a company’s adherence to the compliance requirement of an agreement that was designed to reduce the risk of recurrence of the company’s misconduct’. The authors have extensive experience of corporate monitorships, and each chapter addresses a topic relevant to understanding this important area of practice. The guide first delves into topics common to almost any monitorship – such as the monitor selection process, the task of developing and carrying out a monitorship work plan and the legal issues that every monitor must face. Next, it provides first-hand perspectives on monitorships from a number of viewpoints, and then addresses a variety of issues that arise during specific types of monitorships, including cross-border and international monitorships, and monitorships within specific industries.
In an era when monitorships have become a regular tool of law enforcement, this guide provides critical insights for any private practitioner, government lawyer, senior executive or general counsel, or board member interested in delving more deeply into how monitorships work in practice.
The historical roots of the corporate monitor
The concept of delegating court or government remedial powers to a private actor has historical precedent dating back to English common law. Beginning in the sixteenth century, special masters served as court-appointed assistants with the power to sell property and settle judgments, hold evidentiary hearings, calculate damages and audit financial accounts. These special masters were traditionally private attorneys, law professors or retired judges who were given these powers over a particular case. Appointing such an individual enabled a court to leverage outside resources to achieve its remedial objectives.
More recently, the corporate monitorship has its roots in government efforts to enforce the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against organised crime. About 40 years ago, the DOJ began a practice of selecting a third-party ‘trustee’ in RICO cases to implement institutional reforms among labour unions that had come under the influence of organised crime. Between 1982 and 2004, the DOJ filed at least 20 civil cases against unions asserting RICO violations, and in almost all of them, the DOJ successfully secured court appointment of a third party to oversee the implementation of institutional reforms. For the most part, these proto-monitors served as an ongoing fact-finding tool for the court: although some of them had broader powers, the most common function of these trustees was to gather information about, and periodically report to the court on, facts relevant to remedying the wrongdoing. These RICO cases provide an early instance of third-party monitoring, building on the historical practice of selecting a private party to enhance a court’s ability to exercise its remedial power.
In the early 1990s, external monitors were being appointed to address corporate wrongdoing. In 1994, a federal court approved what some have described as the first deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), following the DOJ’s investigation of Prudential Securities Inc (Prudential) for fraudulently marketing an oil and gas fund to thousands of investors. Prudential had misstated the returns (and tax status) of the fund, used the inflated returns to sell more shares and then paid out returns from new investments (rather than from actual returns). Among the sanctions extracted by the DOJ was the appointment of an ‘independent ombudsman’ for a three-year term who would sit on Prudential’s board of directors and would be required to submit quarterly reports to the DOJ on any instances of criminal conduct or other ‘material improprieties’ at the company. To accomplish that, the DPA required Prudential to report any criminal misconduct to the ombudsman and established a hotline through which employees could anonymously make ‘complaints about ethics and compliance’. Thus, the ombudsman served as the eyes and ears of the DOJ, providing a mechanism by which the government could monitor the company for additional instances of wrongdoing, for years beyond the case’s resolution.
The use of third-party overseers as part of resolving criminal charges coincided with the DOJ’s increased reliance on internal investigations by law firms as part of the investigation process itself. In the 2000s, the DOJ and other regulators began to incentivise companies to hire external counsel to conduct investigations and provide the results of those investigations to the DOJ, both so that the DOJ could outsource the work and also as a lever to make companies demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. This reliance on law firm probes has increased since in both domestic and international investigations.
By the early 2000s, the role of the monitor had expanded beyond simply reporting on facts and began to include the responsibility for making affirmative recommendations about how to address ills at an embattled company. The most well-known example occurred in the wake of one of the most significant accounting fraud scandals in American history, WorldCom, Inc. WorldCom had overstated its income by US$11 billion and its balance sheet by US$75 billion by fraudulently booking expenses as investments; and, as part of the flurry of criminal and regulatory activity that followed, the SEC called for the appointment of a monitor. At first, the SEC asked the court for a relatively limited mandate: to ensure that documents were preserved and that no improper payments were made to executives or WorldCom’s affiliates. With that mandate in mind, WorldCom and the SEC agreed to appoint former SEC chairman Richard C Breeden as monitor. However, soon after his appointment, Breeden’s role expanded significantly: with consent of the SEC and the company, the court empowered Breeden to review WorldCom’s corporate governance structure and to issue broad-ranging recommendations concerning them.
In the end, former Breeden made 78 recommendations designed to address corporate governance weaknesses that caused WorldCom’s collapse, all of which were unanimously approved by WorldCom’s board of directors in 2003. Among other changes, Breeden recommended that the board adopt provisions that barred directors from serving for more than 10 years and a mandate that at least one member depart each year. Other recommendations included switching external auditors every 10 years and creating a website on which investors could bring concerns to the attention of the board and shareholders. Whatever the merits of any particular recommendation, WorldCom as a company benefited. In his final judgment, the district judge praised Breeden ‘not only as a financial watchdog (in which capacity he has saved the company tens of millions of dollars) but also as an overseer who has initiated vast improvements in the company’s internal controls and corporate governance’. Armed with these changes, and its successful reorganisation, the company would continue under a new name, MCI Inc, and eventually sell itself to Verizon Communications in 2005 for US$6.6 billion.
The contemporary monitor
Since WorldCom, the DOJ and others have come to use the appointment of a monitor regularly as a key tool in resolving investigations into corporate wrongdoing. According to the University of Virginia’s corporate prosecution registry, there were 30 independent monitors appointed in DOJ corporate criminal cases between 2001 and 2007 under federal DPAs or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) – a rate of approximately five per year. Between January 2008 and January 2017, the DOJ matched that pace, appointing at least 51 independent corporate monitorships after NPAs and DPAs, though, as discussed below, this pace has slowed slightly in more recent years. This monitorship activity became so extensive that, in November 2015, the DOJ appointed a full-time compliance expert, or ‘monitor czar’, to oversee the monitorship process and to consult with and train prosecutors on compliance issues. Other agencies have also increasingly appointed corporate monitors, including the SEC, state regulators and even foreign regulatory agencies.
These appointments have covered various areas of law and a wide array of industries. Monitors have been appointed following investigations into conduct covered by, for example, bribes in violation of the US Foreign and Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), anticompetitive business practices under antitrust law, improper foreclosures of mortgages and tax evasion, to name just a few. Further, monitorship appointments have touched nearly every industry in which companies do business in the United States: from financial services and healthcare to food services and hospitality.
The powers given to these monitors have also been varied, reflecting in part that monitors are often appointed by agreement between an enforcement agency and a corporation following extensive negotiations. That said, most monitors include a mandate, harking back to the role of the ombudsman in Prudential, of providing a fact-finding and reporting function to a court or government agency. Many others include a broader mandate, akin to the WorldCom monitorship, of making recommendations to the company about how to improve its corporate compliance programme or culture. And an array of other functions have also been implemented, such as auditing the organisation’s compliance with its DPA or NPA, or investigating the root causes of the compliance failure that resulted in a legal or regulatory violation. The varied functions, agencies and areas of laws encompassed by modern-day monitors reflect the flexibility of the independent monitorship as a tool to remedy corporate malfeasance.
But that flexibility has also seen some tightening around the edges, at least when it comes to the DOJ. With the more frequent use of monitors, the DOJ has come to focus on how and under what circumstances to employ them. Much of that scrutiny came in the mid 2000s, in response to certain controversial decisions of the then US Attorney for the District of New Jersey, Christopher J Christie. Christie negotiated DPAs in seven cases during his tenure as US Attorney, of which several included the appointment of a monitor to oversee the corporation’s adherence to the agreement. In one instance, Christie negotiated a DPA that appointed a monitor and, as part of the DPA, required the company to endow an ethics chair at Christie’s alma mater, Seton Hall University School of Law. In another, Christie appointed John Ashcroft – his former DOJ boss – as the monitor in a matter that ultimately resulted in a one-page bill, with no hours tracked, for US$52 million in fees for 18 months of work.
In the wake of outcry about these incidents, the DOJ began to establish guidelines to ensure more transparent procedures around the appointment of monitors. In March 2008, the DOJ issued the Morford Memorandum, its first policy memorandum addressing the selection and use of corporate monitors. To eliminate unilateral selection of a monitorship candidate, the Morford Memorandum required the government office handling a given case to establish an ad hoc committee to consider monitor candidates and obtain approval of the appointment from the Office of the Attorney General. Providing further guidance around the appointment decision, the DOJ issued a further memorandum, in October 2018, by Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Criminal Division, Brian A Benczkowski (the Benczkowski Memorandum), requiring an express analysis of whether a monitor is justified before appointing one in a particular case. The focal point of the Benczkowski Memorandum is its requirement that the DOJ undertake a cost–benefit analysis, stating that ‘the Criminal Division should favor the imposition of a monitor only where there is a demonstrated need for, and clear benefit to be derived from, a monitorship relative to the projected costs and burdens’. Several commentators have viewed this new guidance as an attempt by the DOJ to scale back on corporate monitorships, based on the costs that monitorships may impose on companies. But Benczkowski has since disagreed with that view, stating that the memorandum was not designed to ‘kill all the monitors’, but rather was ‘meant to provide greater clarity’ to both companies and prosecutors to ensure that ‘when they do recommend the appointment of a monitor that they are doing so for the right reasons and with the right scope’. Although only one corporate monitor was imposed by a DPA or NPA in 2018, the use of monitorships returned to pre-2018 levels in 2019, during which at least six monitorships were imposed.
In addition to requirements on when to appoint a monitor, DOJ guidance has also placed restrictions around the functions that should be assigned to a monitor once appointed. The Morford Memorandum sets out that a monitor’s mandate should be focused on reducing the risk that the misconduct at issue in the investigation might recur – as opposed to a broader mandate that might address the risk of other potential wrongdoing at the company. Thus, even when appointed, a DOJ-appointed monitor is supposed to be circumscribed to the specific wrongdoing at issue.
The DOJ’s more recent focus on defining when and how a monitor is appropriate raises the important question of how a monitorship fits within the traditional goals of punishment for wrongdoing. Academic commentary to some extent raises the same question. But, as regulators continue to hone the parameters around the appointment and acceptable mandate of monitors, public commentary indicates that current norms fall comfortably within several well-recognised goals of punishment: deterrence (using punishment to deter wrongdoing by others), incapacitation (preventing wrongdoing by taking away the offender’s ability to commit crimes) and rehabilitation (seeking to change the offender’s disposition towards criminality).
As commentators have noted, the cost and burdens of a monitorship to a company can serve as an effective deterrent against future corporate misconduct. Those costs come in the form of fees to the monitor but also in that the company must devote time, attention and other resources to interfacing with the monitor and responding to and implementing recommendations or other forms of oversight. Indeed, commentators have noted that some companies fear the appointment of a monitor for just this reason: the disruption they could cause to business operations.
Relatedly, the imposition of a monitor can have important incapacitating effects on a company by rendering the company less likely or willing to engage in misconduct. With a corporate monitor peering into decisions and activities of the company, it may make it harder for a company to undertake a course of action that violates the law, or to make decisions to postpone addressing reported instances of wrongdoing in its midst.
Last, the monitorship can also be seen in the context of rehabilitation. In the context of corporations, rehabilitation can take the form of improving the company’s culture and internal procedures to reduce the likelihood of future misconduct. For example, the Morford Memorandum describes a chief purpose of a monitorship as providing a means to ‘address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the corporation’s misconduct’. Consistent with that purpose, in a speech at the New York University School of Law in October 2018, Geoffrey Berman, the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York, argued that ‘a monitor’s role is remedial, not punitive’. Indeed, the DOJ’s National Security Division revised its enforcement policy in 2019 to state that it would not impose a monitor if a company has implemented an effective compliance programme by the time of resolution. If carried out effectively, certainly a monitorship can revitalise a company’s compliance systems and culture. As described above, the WorldCom case demonstrated those rehabilitative benefits, as do other monitorships.
Although the precise details of each monitorship may vary, many are likely to share the important features that put them squarely within the long-standing goals of punishment for wrongdoing. This guide – which assembles chapters from leading lawyers and practitioners in the field – provides insight into these and other monitorship issues, and is a crucial resource for anyone interested in understanding, or practising in, this important area.
1 Anthony S Barkow and Michael W Ross are partners at Jenner & Block LLP. Special thanks to Jenner & Block associates Ravi Ramanathan and Tessa J G Roberts, who were instrumental in preparing this introduction to the first edition and in updating it for this second edition.
2 See, e.g., Rosenstein, Rod J, ‘Keynote Address on Corporate Enforcement Policy, NYU Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement’, New York University School of Law (6 October 2017), at https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporate-compliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017; Yates, Sally Quillian, ‘Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing’, US Department of Justice [DOJ] Memorandum (9 September 2015), at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download; ‘DOJ Announces Important Changes to Yates Memo’, Sidley Austin (30 November 2018), at https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/11/doj-announces-important-changes-to-yates-memo.
4 Nili, Yaron, ‘The Credit Suisse Guilty Plea: Implications for Companies in the Cross Hairs’, Harv. L. Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (9 June 2014), at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/09/the-credit-suisse-guilty-plea-implications-for-companies-in-the-crosshairs; Gilani, Shah, ‘Banks Being Forced to Plead Guilty to Criminal Charges: Will They Survive?’, Forbes (5 May 2014), at https://www.forbes.com/sites/shahgilani/2014/05/05/banks-being-forced-to-plead-guilty-to-criminal-charges-will-they-survive.
5 US Dep’t of Justice [DOJ] and US Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], ‘A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ 71 (16 January 2015), at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf.
6 Khanna, Vikramaditya and Dickinson, Timothy L, ‘The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar’, 105 Mich. L. Rev., 1713, 1715 (2007).
7 Degraw, James S, Rule 53, ‘Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reforms: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters’, 66 N. Y. U. L. Rev., 800, 800 to 801 (1991).
8 Khanna and Dickinson (footnote 6, above), at 1716.
9 Giudice, Lauren, ‘Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement’, 91 B. U. L. Rev., 347, 369 (2011); Jacobs, James B, et al., ‘The Rico Trusteeships after Twenty Years: A Progress Report’, 19 Lab. Law., 419, 452 (2004).
12 Ford, Cristie and Hess, David, ‘Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?’, 34 J. Corp. L., 679, 683 to 684 (2009).
13 Kaal, Wulf A and Lacine, Timothy A, ‘The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013’, 70 The Business Lawyer, 61, 72 (Winter 2014/2015); Eichenwald, Kurt, ‘Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deal’, The New York Times (28 October 1994), at https://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/28/us/brokerage-firm-admits-crimes-in-energy-deals.html.
15 Deferred Prosecution Agreement [DPA], United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc, No. 94-2189 (SDNY 1994), at 3 [Prudential DPA].
16 See Weisselberg, Charles D and Li, Su, ‘Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms’, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 1221, 1243 to 1245 (2011); see generally Eisinger, Jesse, The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Executives (criticising government reliance on law firms for investigations).
17 Hilzenrath, David S, ‘Justice Department, SEC investigations often rely on companies’ internal probes’, The Washington Post, 22 May 2011, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/justice-department-sec-investigations-often-rely-on-companies-internal-probes/2011/04/26/AFO2HP9G_story.html; see generally Eisinger (footnote 16, above).
18 SEC v. WorldCom, Inc, 273 F. Supp. 2d, at 431, 431 (SDNY 2003) [WorldCom].
19 Litigation Release No. 17588, SEC, ‘SEC Charges WorldCom with $3.8 Billion Fraud Commission Action Seeks Injunction, Money Penalties, Prohibitions on Destroying Documents and Making Extraordinary Payments to WorldCom Affiliates, and the Appointment of a Corporate Monitor’ (27 June 2002), at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17588.htm.
20 WorldCom, at 432.
22 Feder, Barnaby J, ‘WorldCom Report Recommends Sweeping Changes for Its Board’, The New York Times, 26 August 2003, at https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/26/business/worldcom-report-recommends-sweeping-changes-for-its-board.html.
24 WorldCom, at 432.
25 O’Brien, Timothy L, ‘WorldCom to Exit Bankruptcy and Change Name to MCI’, The New York Times (24 April 2003), at https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/14/business/worldcom-to-exit-bankruptcy-and-change-name-to-mci.html; Richtel, Matt and Sorkin, Andrew Ross, ‘Verizon Agrees to Acquire MCI for $6.6 Billion, Beating Qwest’, The New York Times (14 February 2005), at https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/14/technology/verizon-agrees-to-acquire-mci-for-66-billion-beating-qwest.html.
26 Khanna and Dickinson (footnote 6, above), at 1718.
27 Corporate Prosecution Registry, University of Virginia (18 January 2019), at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html (exported data).
28 id.; Anello, Robert, ‘Rethinking Corporate Monitors: DOJ Tells Companies to Mind Their Own Business’, Forbes (15 October 2018).
30 See Parts III and IV of this guide; see also, e.g., SEC, Press release, ‘Chemical and Mining Company in Chile Paying $30 Million to Resolve FCPA Cases’ (13 January 2017), at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-13.html; SEC, Press release, ‘Biomet Charged With Repeating FCPA Violations’ (12 January 2017), at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-8.html.
31 Root, Veronica, ‘Modern-Day Monitorships’, 33 Yale Journal on Regulation, 109, 109 (2016).
32 See Part IV of this guide.
33 See, e.g., Prudential DPA, at 3; see also Root (footnote 31, above), at 124 to 127 (providing examples).
34 See, e.g., Consent Order, In the Matter of Credit Suisse AG, NY Dep’t Fin. Servs. (18 May 2014), at 5 to 6; see also Root (footnote 31, above), at 124 to 137 (providing examples).
35 American Bar Association [Am. Bar Ass’n], Monitor Standards (16 June 2016), at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/MonitorsStandards.
36 Patterson, Chaka and Jaffe, Erica, ‘Corporate Monitors: Looking Back and Looking Forward’, Am. Bar Ass’n (2016), at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/wccn2016_patterson.pdf.
37 Barkow, Anthony S and Barkow, Rachel E, ‘Introduction’ in Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct 4 (Anthony S Barkow and Rachel E Barkow 2011) [Prosecutors in the Boardroom].
39 id.; see also House Judiciary Committee, Press release, ‘Conyers and Sánchez Demand Ashcroft Testimony about $52 Million No-bid Contract’ (30 January 2008); Totenberg, Nina, ‘House Panel Questions Ashcroft on No-Bid Contract’, NPR (12 March 2008), at https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88132206.
40 Memorandum from Craig S Morford, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, ‘Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations’ (7 March 2008), at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [Morford Memorandum].
41 Giudice, Lauren, ‘Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement’, 91 B.U. L. Rev., 347, 371 (2011); Morford Memorandum, at 3.
42 Assistant Attorney General Brian A Benczkowski Delivers Remarks at NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance, DOJ (12 October 2018); Memorandum from Brian A Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ, to All Criminal Division Personnel, ‘Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters’ (11 October 2018), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1100531/download [Benczkowski Memorandum].
43 Benczkowski Memorandum, at 2 (emphasis added).
44 Anello (footnote 28, above); Machen, Ronald C, et al., ‘The DOJ’s New Corporate Monitor Policy’, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (5 November 2018), at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/05/the-dojs-new-corporate-monitor-policy; Hillebrecht, John M, et al., ‘To Monitor or Not to Monitor?’, DLA Piper (17 October 2018), at https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2018/10/to-monitor-or-not-to-monitor.
45 Dobrik, Adam, ‘Criminal Division Chief Plays Down Talk of Monitorship Demise’, Global Investigations Review (8 March 2019), at https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/jac/1181316/criminal-division-chief-plays-down-talk-of-monitorship-demise.
46 See DPA, United States v. Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile, S.A., No. 17 Cr. 00013, Dkt. No. 2 (D.D.C. 13 January 2017); DPA, United States v. State Street Corporation (17 January 2017), at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/932581/download; Non-Prosecution Agreement [NPA], Utah Transit Authority (4 April 2017), at https://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/UTA-NPA.PDF; DPA, United States v. Panasonic Avionics Corp., No. 18 Cr. 00118, Dkt. No. 2-1 (D.D.C. 30 April 2018); NPA, Fresnius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA (25 February 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1148951/download; DPA, United States v. Mobile TeleSystems PJSC (22 February 2019), No. 19 Cr. 00167, Dkt. No. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 22 February 2019); DPA, United States v. Rick Weaver Buick GMC Inc., No. 16 Cr. 0030, Dkt. No. 191-1 (W.D.P.A. 15 January 2019); DPA, United States v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericcson, No. 19 Cr. 00884, Dkt. No. 6 (S.D.N.Y 6 December 2019); NPA, Walmart Inc. (20 June 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1175791/download.
47 Morford Memorandum, at 5.
48 Root (footnote 31, above), at 109.
49 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
50 Khanna and Dickinson (footnote 6, above), at 1715.
51 Ford and Hess (footnote 12, above), at 703.
52 Morford Memorandum, at 5.
53 Berman, Geoffrey S, ‘U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman Keynote Speech on Monitorships’, New York School of Law, Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (12 October 2018), at https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2018/10/12/u-s-attorney-geoffrey-berman-keynote-speech-on-monitorships.
54 DOJ, ‘Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations’ (December 2019 Update), at https://www.justice.gov/nsd/ces_vsd_policy_2019/download.